Abstract. The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation explains the meaning of logical operations as operators that construct proofs from proofs of the operands. The BHK interpretation is usually understood as giving intuitionistic interpretation for the logical operators, but, as pointed out by Troelstra and van Dalen [12], it is possible to understand the BHK interpretation classically. We elaborate this idea and develop a classical theory of proofs as abstract mathematical entities where the truth of a proposition becomes equivalent to the existence of proofs of the proposition. We develop a rst order theory of arithmetic, equivalent to PA, and give a classical BHK interpretation for the theory. We show the soundness of the interpretation by showing that if a derivation P of a formula A is given, then the interpretation of P is a proof of the interpretation of A. We also show that the interpreted value of derivations is preserved under reductions of derivations. We also present a system of catch/throw calculus and develop a classical BHK interpretation for it. Since the calculus in non-deterministic, we interpret a derivation by a set of proofs. We show the soundness of the interpretation, and show that if a derivation reduces to another derivation, then the associated set of proofs for the latter derivation is smaller than that for the former derivation.
Introduction
The Tarskian interpretation of formulas interprets a mathematical formula either as true or false. The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation, on the other hand, interprets a mathematical formula by assigning the set of proofs of the given formula. In the BHK interpretation, a formula is true if and only if it has a proof. Here, the notion of a proof is not understood as a formal derivation but as an informal mathematical object just like a natural number or a real number.
In the Tarskian interpretation, for example, A B is true if and only if either A is false or B is true. In the BHK interpretation, A B is true if and only if it has a proof f, i.e., if there is a function f such that for any proof p of A, f(p) is a proof of B. A disjunction A _ B is true in the Tarskian interpreration if either A or B is true, and it is true in the BHK interpretation if A or B has a proof p, and in the rst case (0; p) is a proof of A _ B and in the second case (1; p) is a proof of A _ B. So the BHK interpretation gives ner interpretation than the Tarskian interpretation. In addition to this, these two interpretations have the following essential dierences.
A proposition is classically true if it is true under the Tarskian interpretation, and it is intuitionistically true if it is true under the BHK interpretation. Since the law of the excluded middle is always true classically but not always true intuitionistically, we know that these two interpretations are not equivalent.
However, as pointed out in Troelstra and van Dalen [12] , by modifying the BHK interpretation appropriately it is possible to interpret propositions in terms of proofs in such a way that any proposition is classically true if and only if it has a proof. In this paper, we elaborate this idea, and show that this classical BHK interpretation is consistent with the intuitionistic BHK interpretation in the sense that any proof of a proposition under the intuitionistic BHK interpretation is also a proof of the proposition in the classical BHK interpreration.
We also present a formal system of arithmetic in a modied natural deduction style and show that it is possible to give a sound interpretation of the system in terms of the classical BHK interpretation.
We then consider an extension of the system by the catch/throw inference rules. The resulting system is inherently non-deterministic, and we will show that it is possible to extend the BHK interpretation and give a sound interpretation for this system.
By the well-known Curry-Howard isomorphism, it is possible to regard formal derivations in the intuitionistic fragment of our formal system as programs in a typed language. Then our BHK interpretation gives a natural denotational semantics to this programming language. It is therefore possible to use this framework as a basis for constructive programming where programming is replaced by proving. 2 The classical interpretation To make our argument concrete, we will work on a rst order language whose intended domain of interpretation is the set of natural numbers.
So our language contains the constant 0, a unary function symbol succ (for successor), binary function symbols plus and times. ( We also have symbols for all the primitive recursive functions and associated dening axioms, however, we will not mention them explicitly for the sake of simplicity.) We use x, y, z etc.
as meta variables for individual variables. We dene terms as usual using these symbols. We use a, b, c etc. as meta variables for terms. We will write 0, 1, 2, . . . for 0; succ(0); succ(succ(0)); . . . and call these terms numerals. We will identify each numeral with the natural number which corresponds to the numeral in an obvious way. We use k, l, m, n etc. as meta variables for numerals (and natural numbers). We will write N for the set of natural numbers.
The only primitive predicate symbol we use is =. We will use^, _, , 8 and 9 as primitive logical symbols. Atomic formulas are expressions of the form a = b, and formulas are constructed from atomic formulas by using the above logical symbols. We use A, B, C etc. as meta variables for formulas. We dene ? and :A as abbreviations of succ(0) = 0 and A ?, respectively.
We will call an atomic formula of the form x = k a binding. A binding x = k binds the variable x to the natural number k. We Let a be a term and be an environment. We say that covers a if FV(a) dom(), where FV(a) stands for the set of free variables in a and dom() is the set of variables x such that :x is dened. We dene the concept that an environment covers a formula A similarly.
Given an environment and a term a such that covers a, we can associate a natural number [[a] ] by induction on a as follows. We will say that a denotes [[a] ] in the environment . We have just seen that a term, which is a syntactic entity, denotes a natural number, which is an abstract mathematical object, under any environment that covers the term.
Similarly, we wish to dene the denotation of a formula under an environment that covers the formula. We rst dene propositions as certain sets and then we dene the classical BHK interpretation in such a way that each formula will denote a proposition.
In the classical BHK interpretation, we will use the term`function' in the same way as we use it in classical mathematics based on set theory. Namely, by a function we understand a set f of pairs such that for any objects a; b; c, if (a; b) and (a; c) are in f then b = c. For a pair p, we write 0 (p) ( 1 (p)) for the left (right) component of p, respectively. If f is a function, we put dom(f ) 4 = f 0 (p) j p 2 fg, and if a 2 dom(f), then we write f(a) for the unique b such that (a; b) 2 f. If S is a set and e is a mathematical expression (possibly) containing x such that e denotes a unique object for any x in S, then we write x 2 S: e for the function f such that dom(f ) = S and f(x) = e for any x in S. Also 
We write Prop for the set of propositions. We are thus following the principle of propositions-as-sets since we dened propositions as sets.
Given an environment and a formula A such that covers A, we can associate a proposition [ 
In this way, we can decompose the Tarskian interpretation as the composition of and the BHK interpretation. 3 
Interpretation of derivations
In the previous section, we introduced propositions and proofs as abstract mathematical entities (or semantical objects). In this section we dene derivations as syntactic objects that are intended to denote propositions. So, after dening derivations, we will dene an interpretation of a derivation in an environment by a proof. We also dene reduction rules (or computation rules) for derivations and show that if a derivation reduces to another derivation, then they both denote the same proof (in any environment). In summary, we have the following table: syntactic objects semantic objects term (a; b; c) natural number (k; m; n) formula (A; B; C) proposition (S; T; U) derivation (P; Q; R) proof (p; q; r) context (0; 1) environment () We dene derivations in a natural deduction style. We will give inductive rules that are used to derive judgments. A judgment is either of the form 0`a : N, 0`A : Prop or 0`P : A where 0 is a context, a is a term, P is a derivation and A is a formula. In this way, we will dene judgments, contexts and derivations simultaneously (as well as terms and formulas).
We will dene a context as a nite set of declarations, where a declaration is either of the form x or of the form y A (A, a formula). In the rst case, we say that x is declared as a natural number and in the second case, we say that y is declared as a derivation of A. We say that a is a term if a judgment of the form 0`a : N is derivable by using the above rules. We also dene FV(a) as the set of variables x such that x occurs in 0 .
Next, we have rules for formulas. We say that A is a formula if a judgment of the form 0`A : Prop is derivable by using the above rules. We also dene FV(A) as the set of variables x such that x occurs in 0 . We dene substitution operation on formulas as usual, and we write A[x = a] for the result of substituting a for all the free occurrences of x in A (after appropriately renaming bound variables in A if necessary).
Finally we give rules for derivations. We give these rules as inference rules. We rst give general rules for equality.
The rules specic to natural numbers are as follows. 
We say that P is an intuitionistic derivation if a judgment of the form 0P : C is derivable by using the above rules. If x is in 0, we say that the derivation P depends on the assumption x A .
We now add the following rule which formalizes the law of the excluded midd le. A derivation which is obtained by possibly using this rule in addition to the other rules is called a classical derivation. We can verify that any formula A is derivable in HA (Heyting arithmetic) i`P : A is intuitionistically derivable, and A is derivable in PA (Peano arithmetic) i`P : A is classically derivable.
We have thus dened three kinds of judgments and dened how to derive these judgments. It is easy to see that if a judgment of the rst kind 0`a : N or a judgment of the second kind 0`A : Prop is derivable, then 0 is of the form x 1 . . . ; x n . This means that a term a or a formula A depends on the variables x 1 ; . . . ; x n . Therefore, it is in general necessary that covers these variables in order that [ If a judgment of the third kind 0`P : C is derivable, then each element of the sequence 0 is either of the form x or of the form x A where A is a formula and we write dom(0 ) for the set of such x's. In order to interpret such a context, we need to extend the denition of binding and environment as follows. A binding is an expression of the form x = k where k is a natural number or of the form x = p where p is a proof. An environment is a nite set of bindings such that for each variable x there exists at most one binding of the form x = k or x = p in the set. For an environment and a variable x, :x is dened in the same way as before and we write dom() for the set of variables x such that :x is dened. Let be an environment and 0 be a context. We write j = 0 if dom(0 ) dom(), :x 2 N for each x in 0 , and :x 2 [ P ::= x j id(a) jrepl(P; Q) j succ(P ) j abort(P ) j rec(P; Q) j plus(0; b) j plus(succ(a); b) j times(0; b) j times(succ(a); b) j pair(P; Q) j pair(a; P ) j car(P ) j cdr(P ) j split(P; (x; y):Q) j inl(P ) j inr(P ) j case(P; x:Q; y:R) j x A :P j x:P j apply(P; Q) j apply(P; a) j lem A For each pre-derivation P we can dene the set FV(P ) of free variables in P as expected. For each pre-derivation P and environment such that FV(P ) dom() we dene a proof [ 6 = 0. This is a contradiction, and we see that there can be no such that j = 0; 1. So the theorem holds in this case. u t We now consider reduction rules for pre-derivations.
1. apply(rec(P; Q); 0) 7 ! P . 2. apply(rec(P; Q); succ(a)) 7 ! apply(apply(Q; a); apply(rec(P; Q); a)). 3 . car(pair(P; Q)) 7 ! P . 4. cdr(pair(P; Q)) 7 ! Q. 5 . case(inl(P ); x:Q; y:R) 7 ! Q[x = P ]. 6. case(inr(P ); x:Q; y:R) 7 ! R[y = P]. These reductions enjoy the following subject reduction property. Moreover, we have the following theorem which shows that BHK interpretation is preserved by reductions. We may read this theorem as saying that if a derivation is reducible to another derivation, then although they are syntactically distinct, they both denote the same proof. In this section we extend HA by adding inference rules which correspond to the catch and throw mechanism used in programming language like Lisp. We will write PA c=t for the extended calculus. PA c=t is logically equivalent to PA. Such logical calculi were rst proposed by Nakano [5, 6] and later modied by Sato [11] and Kameyama [3] . Here we use the inference rules introduced in [11] , and we refer the reader to [11, 5] for detailed explanations of the motivations behind these inference rules. We rst extend the language by assuming that there are denumerably many tag variables that are used as tags for derivations. We will use u; v; w etc. as meta variables for tag variables. We dene a tag context as a nite set of declarations of the form u E where u is a tag variable and E is a formula. If 0 is a context and 1 is a tag context, then the pair (0; 1), which we write 0; 1 is said to be an e-context (extended context).
In PA c=t , we will derive judgments of the form 0`P : A; 1 where 0 is a context and 1 is a tag context. If 0`P : A; 1 is derivable, then we will say that P has type A under 0 ; 1. We say that an e-context 0 ; 1 is smaller than another context 5; 6 if 0 5 and 1 6. If 1 is empty, then we will write 0`P : A for 0`P : A; 1.
As we will see later, the reduction rules of derivations are not deterministic. To cope with this situation, we will interpret a derivation in an environment not by a proof but by a set of proofs. Now, PA c=t is obtained from HA by adding the following two rules. Since a judgment of PA c=t contains a tag context in general, we have to modify inference rules of HA as well. Tag contexts in the premises are always inherited in the conclusion of any inference rule. So, for example, the (^I) rule becomes: 0`P : A; 1 5`Q : B; 6 0; 1`pair(P; Q) : A^B; 1; 6 (^I) and we understand that other rules of HA are similarly modied to those of PA c=t , except the following rules which we write down explicitly. These rules are also extensions of the corresponding rules in HA, but we restrict tag contexts in some judgments to be empty. We can show that PA c=t is logically equivalent to PA by using Theorem 4 in [11] . In particular, we can derive the law of the excluded middle in PA c=t as follows. The dierence between these two implication elimination rules is that in ( E) + it is possible to apply a function to an argument that has free tag variables, while in ( E) a function can be applied only to an argument that is tag variable free.
We can also show that PA + c=t is logically equivalent to PA by the same argument.
PA + c=t is therefore consistent, but we could not nd a sound BHK interpretation for PA + c=t . We now wish to give an interpretation of judgments derivable in PA c=t .
Suppose that 0`P : A; 1 is derivable in PA c=t . We will call such P an ederivation (extended derivation) and A; 1 an e-formula. In order to interpret these syntactic entities, we will extend the notions of proposition and proof to those of e-proposition and e-proof. In summary, we have the following table.
syntactic objects semantic objects term (a) natural number (k) tag context (1) proposition environment () e-formula (A; 1) e-proposition (S; ) e-derivation (P ) e-proof (p)
We begin with a preliminary discussion that is necessary to give our interpretation. First, we prepare a notation. Let u be a tag variable, p be a proof and U be a proposition, then we write up for the pair (u; p) and uU for the set fup j p 2 Ug.
Let S be a proposition and X be an arbitrary set. We dene a set S; X by induction on the construction of S as follows. 6.
We have the following lemma which we can verify by induction on the construction of U. 
Let be a function such that dom() is a nite set of tag variables and (u)
is a proposition for any u 2 dom(). We call such a proposition environment.
If is a proposition environment and u is a tag variable, then 0 u denotes the restriction of to dom() 0 fug. Suppose that is a proposition environment such that dom() = fu 1 ; . . . ; u n g where u i are distinct and U i = (u i ) (1 i n). Then for any set X we associate another set '(X) by putting: '(X) 4 = u 1 (U 1 ; X) [ 1 11 [ u n (U n ; X); and we dene jj as the smallest xed point of '. Therefore, jj satises the following set equation. If S is a proposition and is a proposition environment, then we simply write S; for S; jj and call such a set an e-proposition (extended proposition).
Elements of e-propositions will be called e-proofs. Let p 2 S; be an e-proof. p is exceptional if p 2 jj and proper otherwise. If V S; , we put V e 4 = fp 2 V j p is exceptionalg and V p 4 = fp 2 V j p is properg.
Let r be an e-proof in S; . We rst dene a set TV(r) dom() as follows. If r 2 , then r is of the form up where u 2 dom() and p 2 (u); , and in this case we put TV(r) 4 = fug [ TV(p). If r 6 2 jj, then we dene TV(r) inductively as follows. If TV(r) = ;, then we say that r is tag variable free and if u 2 TV(r), then we say that u occurs in TV(r). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 10. If r 2 S; and u 6 2 TV(r), then r 2 S; 0 u.
Next let r 2 S; and u 2 dom(). We dene a set r=u (u); as follows. r=u will be said to be the u component of r. If It is easy to check that u 2 TV(r) if and only if r=u is non-empty. We also have the following lemma which we can prove by using Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. r=u (u); 0 u.
If an e-proof p is in the u component of an e-proof r, then it means that up is a possible exceptional value of r. So, unlike ordinary proofs we discussed in section 3, an e-proof denotes a set of its possible values.
We now dene the catch and the throw operations on e-proofs. Let r 2 S;
be an e-proof and u be a tag variable. Then, we put Let us consider the reduction of PA c=t derivations. We have the following reduction rules for PA c=t in addition to those for HA. Via the Curry-Howard isomorphism, derivations in PA c=t can be seen as functional programs and these reduction rules can be thought of as giving operational semantics to these functional programs.
Moreover, the BHK interpretation respects these reduction rules in the following way. In this paper, we dened propositions and proofs as abstract mathematical entities and showed that formulas and derivations, which are introduced as formal counterparts to propositions and proofs, can be interpreted by the classical version of BHK interpretation. As a concrete example of classical BHK interpretation, we gave an interpreration for classical rst order arithmetic PA. This interpretation is almost constructive, since the interpretation of a derivation is the same as the interpretation for constructive arithmetic HA if the derivation is obtained without using the law of the excluded middle. We showed that the interpretation is sound and the denotation of derivation is preserved under reductions of derivations.
We also gave an interpretation for the system PA c=t of the catch/throw calculus which is obtained from HA by adding the rules for the catch and throw operations. In PA c=t , the law of the excluded middle is derivable by using the cath/throw rules. If we look at such a derivation as a program, then we cannot compute (reduce) it in a constructive way. However, Murthy [4] formulated PA (as a programming language), roughly, as HA + the control operator C which serves as a witness of the law of the double negation elimination, and showed that for any 5 0 2 sentence A, if P : A, then P can be computed constructively.
We take this as a hint that we might be able to extract constructive contents from classical derivations derived in PA c=t , since the law of the double negation elimination is certainly derivable in PA c=t .
In order to pursue the possibility of extracting constructive contents from the catch/throw calculus, we do a case study using an example given in [4] . We will work in PA + c=t informally. We consider the sentence A 4 = 9n: prime(n)^n < 100 Let P 2 be a derivation of prime(2)^2 < 100 and P 3 be a derivation of prime(3)3 < 100, so that we have`pair A (2; P 2 ) : A and`pair A (3; P 3 ) : A. We writè P 2 : A and`P 3 : A for these derivations. Then, we can derive the following judgment 1 , where the rst abort is abort prime(102) and the second abort is abort 102<100 . . Note that in PA c=t , the argument of any functional application must be tag variable free, and the soundness of the BHK interpretation for PA c=t comes from this restriction.
A number of classical logical systems have been introduced recently and most of them are explicitly designed to extract constructive contents of classical derivations ([1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 , 10]). We hope that the classical BHK interpretation is useful for the analysis of these systems.
